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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Evaluating  Accountable  Care  Organizations  is difﬁcult  because  there  is a great  deal  of  heterogeneity  in
terms  of their  reimbursement  incentives  and  other  programmatic  features.  We examine  how  variation
in  reimbursement  incentives  and  administration  among  two Medicaid  managed  care  plans  impacts  uti-
lization  and spending.  We  use a quasi-experimental  approach  exploiting  the  timing and  county-speciﬁc
implementation  of  Medicaid  managed  care  mandates  in  two contiguous  regions  of Kentucky.  We  ﬁnd
large  differences  in the  relative  success  of each  plan  in reducing  utilization  and spending  that  are  likely
driven  by  important  differences  in  plan  design.  The  plan  that  capitated  primary  care  physicians  and  con-38
13
eywords:
edicaid
anaged care
tracted  out  many  administrative  responsibilities  to an  experienced  managed  care  organization  achieved
signiﬁcant  reductions  in  outpatient  and  professional  utilization.  The  plan  that  opted  for a fee-for-service
reimbursement  scheme  with  a group  withhold  and  handled  administration  internally  saw  a  much more
modest  reduction  in  outpatient  utilization  and  an  increase  in  professional  utilization.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the CC BY-NC-ND
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. Introduction
Although the implementation of the key features of the Afford-
ble Care Act (ACA) is well underway, policymakers continue to
truggle with the best health care ﬁnance and delivery system to
chieve the “Triple Aim” of improved quality of care, improved
opulation health, and reduced cost (Berwick et al., 2008). This
s especially true among state Medicaid programs, as many states
ave recently expanded their Medicaid programs in January 2014,
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espite concerns about the impact of the expansion on state
udgets.3
One relatively new approach to this problem is to create what
re known as Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), which can
e generally deﬁned as coordinated networks of medical providers
hat assume the risk for the quality and total cost of care for their
atients (Burns and Pauley, 2012). As discussed in Fisher et al.
2012), much like more traditional managed care organizations
MCOs), health maintenance organizations (HMOs), or integrated
elivery networks, ACOs may  differ both in terms of speciﬁc con-
ract characteristics and the populations they serve, with current
COs providing care through contracts for Medicaid, Medicare, pri-
ate payers, and different combinations of these groups.
One challenge associated with evaluating the success of
COs, MCOs, or integrated delivery networks, is the fact that
here may  be a great deal of heterogeneity across these
etworks/organizations/plans in terms of their reimbursement
ncentives and other key programmatic features (Gaynor et al.,
3 For a summary of state Medicaid expansion plans, see: http://kff.org/medicaid/
tate-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-
are-act/.
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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for billing purposes, this did not represent a change in reporting
practice.7 The region 5 partnership dissolved within two and a half
years of its introduction. Today Medicaid recipients in region 3 are
5 Currie and Fahr (2005) cite reports from the Health Care Financing Administra-
tion that classify the Medicaid managed care penetration rate in Kentucky as over 50
percent in 1992, 1993, and 1994. This is likely due to Kentucky Medicaid’s primary
care  case management program (KENPAC) where recipients are assigned a speciﬁc
primary care provider. Although a primary care “gatekeeper” physician is one part8 J. Marton et al. / Journal of H
004). For example, some plans may  reimburse primary care
roviders via capitation while others may  reimburse via fee-for-
ervice (FFS). Research attempting to make blanket statements
bout the impact of ACOs or MCOs in improving quality and reduc-
ng costs seem to sweep this heterogeneity under the rug. This
hallenge, along with the concern about the non-random selection
f participants, suggests that there is little convincing evidence on
he impact of such plans on the utilization of health care services,
ealth care costs, and health outcomes.
The purpose of our paper is to directly examine how reim-
ursement incentives and other key programmatic features among
edicaid accountable/managed care plans impact health care uti-
ization and spending using a quasi-experimental approach that
xploits the timing and county-speciﬁc implementation of Med-
caid managed care mandates in Kentucky in the late 1990s.4 The
edicaid program in Kentucky was changed from a FFS system
o a managed care plan in two geographically distinct sub-sets of
ounties. We  can compare recipients initially in each of the two sets
f “treatment” counties before and after this reform with recipi-
nts initially in neighboring “control” counties that remained in a
FS system, in order to deal with any concerns about non-random
election into the plans.
Despite serving Medicaid recipients in the same state, and oper-
ting less than 100 miles apart, the two plans selected very different
eimbursement mechanisms for physicians and diverged along
ther plan dimensions as well. These differences motivate our
eterogeneous treatment effect approach of modeling the impact
f each plan separately. The Louisville-centered plan (Passport)
lected to reimburse physicians using a capitated payment scheme,
hile the Lexington-centered plan (Kentucky Health Select or KHS)
pted for a modiﬁed FFS reimbursement scheme for physicians fea-
uring a group withhold. Another important difference is that the
ouisville-centered “capitated” plan contracted out administrative
esponsibilities, such as utilization review, to an experienced MCO
hile the Lexington-centered “withhold” plan decided to handle
uch responsibilities internally. These fundamental organizational
ifferences between the two plans could have an impact upon their
bility to improve quality, while at the same time reducing utiliza-
ion and spending.
We  ﬁnd that both organizations/plans decreased the probabil-
ty of any monthly outpatient utilization among the children in
ur sample, though the Louisville-centered “capitated” plan was
ble to do so to a greater degree (a 61 percent reduction versus
 17 percent reduction). In addition, both plans appear to have
ad a minimal impact on the probability of any monthly inpatient
tilization for children, which may  be explained by low baseline
npatient utilization rates. Our most striking ﬁnding is that the
ouisville-centered “capitated” plan reduced the monthly prob-
bility of any professional (physician) utilization by 44 percent
mong children, while in the Lexington-centered “withhold” plan
rofessional (physician) utilization actually increased by 6 percent.
f we instead measure utilization along the intensive margin (using
he number of monthly visits or monthly expenditures), we  still
nd that the Louisville-centered “capitated” plan led to signiﬁcant
eductions in professional and outpatient utilization not matched
y the Lexington-centered “withhold” plan.
Both plans increased the probability of having any monthly well
hild visits, though the Louisville-centered “capitated” plan did so
o a greater degree. Therefore, the heterogeneous treatments gen-
rated by differences in plan design between the two regions led
o different outcomes with respect to utilization. Finally, we ﬁnd
4 According to the Kaiser Family Foundation (2012), over sixty ﬁve percent of all
edicaid beneﬁciaries were enrolled in some form of a managed care plan by 2010.
o
t
m
e
w
a
mconomics 36 (2014) 47–68
uggestive evidence that the reductions in utilization observed in
he Louisville-centered “capitated” plan did not lead to adverse
ealth outcomes for asthmatic children, as measured by inpatient
ospitalizations. These results are robust to a variety of speciﬁca-
ion checks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 pro-
ides a description of the policy change in Kentucky Medicaid.
ection 3 reviews the relevant literature on physician reimburse-
ent and Medicaid managed care and describes how our approach
ontributes to this literature. Our methodological approach and
dentiﬁcation strategy is described in Section 4 and our data in Sec-
ion 5. Sections 6 and 7 present our results and speciﬁcation checks.
ection 8 concludes with a discussion of policy implications.
. The introduction of managed care in Kentucky Medicaid
.1. Brief history
In October 1995, the Commonwealth of Kentucky received Cen-
ers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) approval to initiate a major
estructuring of the Kentucky Medicaid program by dividing the
tate into eight regional managed care networks. Within each
egion public and private providers were expected to collaborate
o form managed care partnerships to oversee the provision of
edicaid services, rather than contracting these services out to
ommercial managed care providers. The goals of this restructuring
ere to improve access and quality of care, stabilize cost growth,
nd emphasize primary care and prevention.
In November 1997, Medicaid managed care enrollment began
n the two  regions that contain the state’s two  major urban
reas, region 3 (anchored by Louisville) and region 5 (anchored
y Lexington).5 These, along with the other regions, are labeled
n Fig. 1. The managed care organization/plan covering region 3
as named the Passport Health Plan (Passport) and the managed
are organization/plan covering region 5 was named the Kentucky
ealth Select Plan (KHS). Ultimately, the other six regions were not
ble to successfully create managed care partnerships. Passport,
esigned around the University of Louisville network, was  charged
ith providing Medicaid managed care coverage to all Medicaid
ecipients in Jefferson County (containing Louisville) and 15 sur-
ounding counties. Similarly, the KHS plan was designed around
he University of Kentucky network and was  charged with provid-
ng Medicaid managed care to all Medicaid recipients in Fayette
ounty (containing Lexington) and 20 surrounding counties.6
Both organizations also agreed to continue reporting encounter
ata to the state as they had under Medicaid FFS reimbursement
ules. Because the organizations were made up of local providers
hat were already accustomed to reporting claims to the statef  most managed care programs, we do not consider this feature alone to be enough
o  characterize a plan as being managed care.
6 There are some Medicaid recipients in these counties that are excluded from
anaged care. They include those in nursing facilities or psychiatric facilities for an
xtended stay, those served under home and community-based waivers, and those
ho must spend down to meet eligibility income criteria.
7 This model of having a single community-organized health system (COHS) man-
ge care in a given region without accepting commercial bids was one of several
odels used in California to implement Medicaid managed care.
J. Marton et al. / Journal of Health Economics 36 (2014) 47–68 49
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potential reward for meeting budget targets. PCPs were organizedFig. 1. Kentucky’s 8 Regions, including passport co
till covered under the Passport managed care plan, while Medic-
id recipients in the rest of the state (including recipients in region
) were covered under Fee-For-Service (FFS) Medicaid until late
011.8
Table 1 provides trends in overall and managed care eligibility
ver time. The table suggests that these two regions account for
lmost half of the state’s total population and roughly 35 percent of
he state’s Medicaid population. Table 1 also suggests that Medicaid
s an important potential source of insurance coverage in Kentucky.
.2. State capitation payments to Passport and KHS
Both Passport and KHS were given the responsibility of pro-
iding comprehensive health care coverage for their Medicaid
nrollees in exchange for capitation payments (ﬂat monthly fees
er recipient based on their category of eligibility) negotiated with
he state. The monthly capitation rates for most of the timeframe
e analyze in this paper are presented in Table 2A. Appendix
able A1 presents a list of the services covered under these cap-
tation payments and those excluded for both plans. The excluded
ervices were to be covered by the state directly through FFS reim-
ursement or capitated through a separate waiver.
8 The discussion of the history and institutional structure of the Passport and KHS
ealth plans presented here draws in large part from Bartosch and Haber (2004),
 report completed by RTI International for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
ervices. To learn more about the most recent reforms to the Kentucky Medicaid
rogram see: http://medicaidmc.ky.gov/Pages/index.aspx.
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U (Region 3) and Kentucky Health Select (Region 5).
.3. Plan reimbursement for providers
Passport elected to reimburse primary care providers (PCPs) on
 capitated basis, with the capitation rate adjusted for the age, gen-
er, and eligibility mix  of their patients.9 In addition, PCPs were
ligible for performance-based bonuses based on such activities as
xtending ofﬁce hours, maintaining an appointment reminder sys-
em, accepting new patients, and meeting goals for utilization of
mergency room visits, inpatient days, and specialty referral costs.
n order for Passport to better measure resource use, an encounter
laims bonus of roughly $1 for every non-FFS claim submitted was
lso established for PCPs. Hospital reimbursement was set up on a
er diem basis using the Medicaid fee schedule with a 10 percent
ithhold.10
KHS instead elected to reimburse physicians and hospitals on a
FS basis using the Medicaid fee schedule with a 20 percent with-
old. This means that physicians would receive 80 percent of the
ee associated with each service performed and the remaining 20
ercent was  held back until the end of the year to be used as anto “pools of doctors” or PODs with each POD assigned a budget
y KHS. If actual health care expenditures attributed to the POD
9 When we  say that Passport capitates primary care providers, we mean Passport
akes capitated payments to primary care practices. These could include different
umbers of individual primary care providers whose individual compensation from
he  practice is not observed.
10 The current Medicaid fee schedule for Kentucky is available at the following
RL: http://chfs.ky.gov/dms/fee.htm.
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Table 1
Trends in Kentucky Population and Medicaid Enrollment (in thousands).
Year Statewide
population
Region 3
(Passport)
population
Region 5
(KHS)
population
Statewide
Medicaid
enrollment
Region 3
(Passport)
Medicaid
enrollment
Region 5
(KHS)
Medicaid
enrollment
Statewide
Medicaid
managed
care
Statewide
Medicaid
FFS
1997 3953 1093 719 532 112 75 0 532
1998  3985 1102 730 521 109 73 181 340
1999  4018 1114 742 518 106 71 177 341
2000  4049 1125 810 557 114 79 114 443
2001  4066 1132 801 608 126 88 126 482
2002  4087 1139 790 627 131 91 131 496
Sources: Population estimates are from the Kentucky State Data Center (http://ksdc.louisville.edu/) and the Medicaid eligible estimates are from the Kentucky Cabinet for
Health  and Family Services (http://chfs.ky.gov/dms/stats.htm). Passport was  implemented in Region 3 from 1998 onward. Kentucky Health Select (KHS) was implemented
in  Region 5 during 1998–1999.
Table 2A
Passport and Kentucky Health Select monthly capitation rates (in dollars).
Eligibility category Passport
Prior to November 1997 November 1997 to June 1998 July 1998 to December 1998
AFDC/TANF N/A 137.00 146.20
Foster Care N/A 177.38 188.52
SOBRA N/A 171.02 181.85
SSI  with Medicare N/A 117.00 125.24
SSI  without Medicare N/A 504.65 531.51
SCHIP  N/A N/A N/A
Eligibility category Kentucky Health Select
Prior to November 1997 November 1997 to June 1998 July 1998 to December 1998
AFDC/TANF N/A 124.18 150.39
Foster Care N/A 166.26 194.52
SOBRA N/A 160.28 188.67
SSI  with Medicare N/A 143.03 170.16
SSI  without Medicare N/A 382.39 421.14
SCHIP  N/A N/A N/A
Source: Adopted from Bartosch and Haber (2004).
Notes: AFDC/TANF refers to Medicaid recipients whose eligibility is tied to their eligibility for cash welfare, called Aid to Families with Dependent Children prior to the 1997
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Through our description of Kentucky’s Medicaid reform out-
lined in previous section, we view our study as contributing to two
distinct strands of literature in health economics.11 First, althoughelfare  reform and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families afterwards. SOBRA ref
ct,  which expanded Medicaid eligibility for children and pregnant women. SSI re
CHIP  refers to the State Children’s Health Insurance Program.
xceeded the budget, then the proportion of the 20 percent with-
old returned to the POD at the end of the year would be reduced.
f the POD came in under budget, then the entire withhold would
e returned as well as the surplus.
.4. Summary of the key differences between the plans
As summarized in Table 2B, a key difference between the two
rganizations was the way in which physicians were reimbursed.
assport used capitation, while KHS opted for FFS with a 20 percent
ithhold. Under the Passport plan, the marginal revenue generated
or a PCP from an additional ofﬁce visit is essentially zero. On the
ther hand, PCPs still received additional revenue from additional
isits under the KHS plan. Although the withhold may  have encour-
ged some utilization reduction, it is important to note that this
onus was not measured at the level of the individual provider.
herefore, each individual physician may  have had an incentive
o “free ride” off of the utilization reductions generated by other
embers of their POD, while keeping their own schedule full.
Another key difference between the two organizations was
he way in which they performed basic administrative functions,
uch as claims processing, member/provider services, case man-
gement, and information sharing. Passport opted to outsource
hese responsibilities to an administrative service organization
ASO), AmeriHealth Mercy Health Plan, based in Philadelphia. KHS
a
M
C Medicaid recipients eligible as a result of the Sixth Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
 Medicaid recipients also eligible for Supplemental Security Income Program and
ecided to handle these responsibilities internally, despite a lack of
xperience at managing a managed care network. To the extent that
COs/ACOs reduce utilization/spending through increased coor-
ination of care and careful review of physician practice patterns,
xperience in these basic administrative functions may  be crucial.
assport’s choice to outsource these functions to an experienced
SO may  have contributed to its relative success at reducing uti-
ization among its enrollees.
These initial choices described above made by the Passport
rganization (capitating reimbursement for PCPs and outsourcing
mportant administrative functions to an experienced ASO) cre-
ted a plan that was in many ways much closer to a “textbook”
MO/MCO/ACO than the KHS plan. Thus, we would anticipate Pass-
ort to be more successful at reducing utilization than KHS.
. Literature review11 Note that there is a lengthy literature that examines the effects of private man-
ged  care plans as well as Medicaid managed care. See, for example, Luft (1981),
iller and Luft (1994, 1997), Glied (2000), Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000), and
utler et al. (2000) for discussions of managed care, and Sparer (2012) for a recent
J. Marton et al. / Journal of Health Economics 36 (2014) 47–68 51
Table  2B
Summary of plan differences.
Passport KHS
Timeframe November 1997–present November 1997–June 2000
#  Counties/Anchor 16 counties/Louisville 21 counties/Lexington
PCP  reimbursement Capitation FFS based on Medicaid fee schedule with 20% withhold
Hospital reimbursement FFS based on Medicaid fee schedule with a 10% withhold FFS based on Medicaid fee schedule with 20% withhold
Specialist reimbursement FFS based on Medicaid fee schedule with a 10% withhold FFS based on Medicaid fee schedule with a 10% withhold
Administrative Responsibilities Contracted out to AmeriHealth Mercy Health Plan Handled internally
Report claims/encounters as in the
pre-reform period?
Yes Yes
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any academic studies on different forms of managed care (such
s ACOs, MCOs, HMOs, PCCMs and IPOs) have emphasized the
ncentives of capitation payments, the reimbursement to physi-
ians within the organization can vary, even though the organization
s a whole is paid on a capitated basis.12 In particular, the KHS com-
ination of FFS physician reimbursement and a group “withhold”
or meeting budget targets has rarely been examined, and only in
he context of a private managed care plan. Second, there is a some-
hat larger “case study” literature that has examined the effects of
 given state’s changes in its Medicaid program on utilization, cost,
nd health outcomes.
With respect to physician reimbursement within an organiza-
ion, Cooper and Rebitzer (2002) note that “most of the empirical
iterature on physician incentives and managed care organizations
reats physician incentive systems as a black box whose internal
peration is obscured from view.” (p. 12). One exception is Gaynor
t al. (2004), who study how PCPs in managed care networks
espond to incentives to contain medical expenditures.13 The HMO
n that study divided physicians into panels of doctors (or PODS).14
art of the reimbursement for the group was withheld, and then the
ntire group was given ﬁnancial rewards if they collectively con-
ained costs. GRT found that there was signiﬁcant free-riding when
he size of the POD became too large. For example, PODs with three
hysicians were much more effective at coming in under the cap
han PODs with six or more physicians. Our study sheds further
ight on the ineffectiveness of extremely large PODs, since the Lex-
ngton region had a similar withholding policy for physicians, and
he POD size averaged 20 primary care physicians.15
Although there is a large literature on Medicaid managed care
see the recent summary contained in Duggan and Hayford, 2013),
he most convincing studies in this area have either focused on the
case study” of California, which created a quasi-experiment set up
y phasing in Medicaid managed care in different counties, or at the
ational level through different state-by-state implementations.16he published studies that take advantage of California’s county-
evel Medicaid managed care mandates are most similar to our
pproach. Duggan (2004) examines the impact of managed care
ummary on Medicaid managed care studies. For a discussion of Medicare managed
are, see Kaiser Family Foundation (2007) Fact Sheet “Medicare Advantage” and for
ore discussion of Medicaid managed care, see Kaiser Family Foundation (2012)
olicy Brief “Medicaid and Managed Care: Key Data, Trends, and Issues”.
12 See, for example, Burns and Pauley (2012) for recent discussion of ACOs.
13 See Chalkley and Tilley (2006) and Dusheiko et al. (2006) for examples from the
K.
14 There is also a theoretical literature that explores the consequences of organiza-
ional fragmentation in the health care system, which emphasizes that physicians
re central to resource allocation and care processes within a hospital, but are largely
ndependent of hospital management. See Cebul et al. (2008).
15 Bartosch and Haber (2004, p. 23).
16 Examples at the national level include Duggan and Hayford (2013), Herring and
dams (2011), Currie and Fahr (2005), and Kaestner et al. (2005).
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on Medicaid spending and birth outcomes. Aizer et al. (2007)
lso examine the impact of managed care on birth outcomes.17
hese studies emphasize the impact of the capitated payment
hat the state government offers to the managed care organiza-
ion per patient, but do not discuss in detail the reimbursement
f physicians.18 To date, no study has systematically examined
ow physician reimbursement within managed care organiza-
ions has affected utilization in Medicaid. Unlike California, where
here were a multitude of organizations who may have different
eimbursement arrangements with their physicians, in Kentucky,
assport and KHS each had clear, and uniquely different reimburse-
ent regimes for physicians.
There are several other differences between the Kentucky
eform and the California reform that we exploit to our advan-
age. First, unlike in Kentucky, the California Medicaid managed
are data used in the literature has no information on utilization
or Medicaid managed care recipients. Duggan (2004) focuses on
edicaid capitation payments rather than utilization in his indi-
idual level analysis and looks at birth outcomes at the county level
sing hospital discharge data rather than Medicaid claims data.
izer et al. (2007) focus on birth outcomes, rather than overall uti-
ization, using the California Birth Statistical Master File and Birth
ohort ﬁles. A second issue with the California Medicaid data is that
he mandates for managed care were not binding for much larger
roups of recipients and services than in Kentucky. For example,
n some California counties undocumented workers, SSI recipients,
nd foster children were not required to participate in Medicaid
anaged care. In Kentucky, Medicaid managed care is mandatory
or SSI recipients and foster children if they live in any of the man-
ged care counties. Both California papers attempt to deal with this
ssue in their analysis of birth outcomes by focusing on those in
heir data for whom the managed care mandate is most likely to be
inding.
Song et al. (2012) also provide more recent “case study” evi-
ence from Massachusetts by examining provider organizations
hat entered into an alternative contracting arrangement with Blue
ross Blue Shield in 2009–2010. This contracting arrangement con-
ists of a global budget with pay-for-performance and places the
articipating provider organizations at risk for excessive spend-
ng. They found that rates of spending increases slowed in these
rovider organizations as compared to control practices, with a
17 Barham et al. (2013) also examine birth and pregnancy outcomes in California
nd ﬁnd that outcomes improve for the moderately disadvantaged but not the
xtremely disadvantaged.
18 Duggan (2004) notes that in California “fee-for-service reimbursement rates
or  many providers, including physicians and pharmacies, were set at the state, and
ot  at the provider level” (p. 2563). The only discussion of physician reimbursement
ithin a managed care organization is anecdotal; Duggan notes that in one managed
are organization – Cal Optima in Orange County – the physicians received “140%
f  the Medicaid fee schedule.” (p. 2566).
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also follow the literature and focus on our attention on children,
speciﬁcally children enrolled continuously from January 1997 to
June 1999.21 As a speciﬁcation check, we  replicate our analysis on
20 Table 3 suggests that the Passport region (region 3) has a lower percentage of
white inhabitants than any other region and is among the highest in terms of high
school graduation rates. The KHS region (region 5) has the second lowest percentage
of  white inhabitants and the lowest homeownership rate. The poverty rate in both
managed care regions is much lower than in regions 4, 7, and 8.
21 Some studies analyze individuals with Medicaid spells as short as one month,
yet there are a number of challenges with using short Medicaid spells to measure the
impact of managed care. First, Medicaid eligibility changes are often associated with
other changes in socioeconomic circumstances (such as changes in income, private
insurance status, and marital status of the parent) that are difﬁcult to observe in
administrative data but may  independently affect health care utilization. For exam-
ple,  children who newly enroll in Medicaid due to a drop in parent’s income (and
perhaps loss in private health insurance) may have utilization that is incorrectly
attributed to the managed care or FFS arrangement rather than the drop in income.
On the other hand, children who  are made eligible for Medicaid due to marital disso-2 J. Marton et al. / Journal of H
igger difference in the second year after implementation than the
rst.
. Methods and identiﬁcation strategy
.1. Identifying the impact of medicaid managed care
It is well recognized by health economists that selection
ias represents a key barrier to assessing the impact of man-
ged/accountable care on utilization. In many settings, especially
n the private market, consumers have the choice between some
orm of a managed care plan and a FFS plan. Since the managed
are plan represents the cheaper, but less generous option, it will
end to be more attractive to healthier individuals.19 We  refer to
his as “enrollee selection.” Thus the lower costs per managed
are enrollee may  reﬂect more stringent ﬁnancial incentives on
roviders and alternative delivery methods, a healthier pool of
articipants (enrollee selection), or both. To identify the “pure”
anaged care effect one needs to keep the health composition
ithin each type of plan constant, and, in general, OLS estimates
ill fail to do so and thus overstate the pure managed care effect.
In the context of public health insurance, especially Medicaid,
he selection issues are perhaps somewhat different. The Medicaid
opulation is poor and typically faces no copayments, premiums,
r deductibles. In some contexts – such as the California Medicaid
anaged care setting that Duggan (2004) and Aizer et al. (2007)
tudied – recipients were initially able to voluntarily choose Med-
caid managed care or stay in FFS, and then some California counties
ater mandated managed care enrollment. At least in the voluntary
etting, it is not clear that the ﬁnancial incentives to be in a man-
ged care plan are very strong because Medicaid FFS plans tend to
ave little patient cost-sharing. Thus, it is not clear whether the
election bias will be the same as in the private setting.
In the Kentucky context, the switch from FFS to managed care
as mandatory for a large portion of the Medicaid population,
ccurred at essentially one point in time, and was implemented
n some, but not all Kentucky counties. In other words, a Medic-
id recipient could not simply choose to opt into a managed care
rogram, instead enrollment was based purely on county of resi-
ence. Therefore, enrollees in certain counties were automatically
nrolled in managed care, while those in neighboring counties out-
ide the managed care boundaries were not. This description of
anaged care implementation in Kentucky suggests a “difference-
n-differences” approach to identify the impact of managed care
n health care utilization that is free from the “enrollee selection”
roblem that plagues much of the literature.
One option for implementing this difference-in-differences
pproach would be to collect monthly enrollment and utilization
ata on all Medicaid enrollees in all 120 Kentucky counties before
nd after the reform. We  could run a regression with an indicator of
ny monthly utilization as the dependent variable and an indicator
f managed care enrollment, which would equal zero for all recip-
ents in the pre-period and equal one for those living in one of the
7 managed care counties in the post period, as the independent
ariable. Thus we would be comparing the monthly utilization of
hose living in the 37 managed care counties before and after the
eform with those living in any of the other 83 counties (see Fig. 1).While such an approach would shed light on the impact of
anaged care, it suffers from several problems. First, it would
reat managed care counties containing Kentucky’s largest cities
19 Cutler and Reber (1998) show that younger and healthier individuals at Har-
ard switched to less generous health plans after cost-sharing arrangements were
hanged, leading to an “adverse selection death spiral.”
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Louisville in Jefferson county and Lexington in Fayette county) the
ame as much more rural managed care counties. In addition, these
ities served as the “hub” for managed care activities within their
espective regions, so they are also different from more rural areas
n that regard. It may  be the case that because Jefferson county
ontains Louisville, it is too different from other Kentucky counties
or any comparison to be feasible. Second, it may  not be reason-
ble to use counties in the far eastern or western parts of the state
s controls for managed care counties in central Kentucky. Table 3
rovides a descriptive comparison of each of the eight proposed
anaged care regions using “QuickFacts” data from the U.S. Cen-
us and conﬁrms that there are important differences between the
egions.20 Third, there are also important differences in utilization
atterns in adults versus children, so an analysis of all enrollees
ould ignore these differences. Finally, it does not address the
otential endogeneity of residence. Enrollees may  move across
ounty lines in order to opt in or opt out of managed care. We
efer to this as “migration endogeneity”, an issue recognized in the
alifornia Medicaid context by Aizer et al. (2007).
Given these concerns, an alternative approach would be to focus
ur attention on enrollees in the outermost counties in both man-
ged care regions that share a border with a FFS county. These
utermost managed care counties and their FFS neighbors are likely
o make for much more homogenous treatment and control groups
han would be the case if we  used all 120 counties. These outermost
anaged care counties are also more likely to have been “follow-
rs” rather than “leaders” in terms of setting managed care policy
or their regions. This “border county” approach is motivated by,
mong others, the Black (1999) analysis of the effects of school test
cores on housing prices. By looking at geographic areas that are
ontiguous and relatively homogeneous – yet are treated very dif-
erently by the implementation of managed care – we  feel more
onﬁdent that any measured impacts do not represent other omit-
ed county-level factors.
In order to address migration endogeneity, we use managed
are eligibility based on county of residence in January 1997 as
 proxy for actual managed care enrollment. Presumably, choice of
esidence in January 1997 is exogenous to the implementation of
he Medicaid managed care that occurred in November 1997. Weution may  be less likely to use health care due to the increased time constraints on
he single parent. Second, lagged insurance coverage could affect current utilization.
or example, uninsured children who enroll in Medicaid may initially have increased
tilization due to pent-up health care demand, yet this could be incorrectly identi-
ed as a HMO  effect. Third, as Cutler and Gruber (1996) note, there are children who
re eligible, but not participating in the Medicaid program who might be viewed
s  having conditional Medicaid coverage. What this means is that when the child
ets sick, it may  be relatively easy to enroll the child in Medicaid. Similar to the
ent-up demand story, conditional coverage may  incorrectly attribute utilization
o  managed care or FFS plans. For each of these reasons, the results from an analysis
J. Marton et al. / Journal of Health E
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artially enrolled children. The results are unchanged from what
e present.
While this alternative approach is promising, there is one ﬁnal
ssue to be addressed: whether or not it makes sense to model the
anaged care “treatments” in each region as being homogeneous.
ur prior description of the differences in plan characteristics
cross the two regions clearly suggests that we should model the
mpact of managed care in each region separately. Our use of sepa-
ate border county FFS control groups for each region should handle
ther baseline differences between the two regions, such as differ-
nces in baseline utilization.
To summarize our empirical strategy, we  deﬁne separate treat-
ent and control shared-border counties for each of the two
anaged care regions and track the utilization of all children that
i) live in those counties in January 1997 and (ii) are continuously
nrolled in Medicaid until June 1999. Fig. 2 illustrates the 4 Passport
reatment and 7 control counties as well as the 9 KHS treatment
nd 14 control counties used in this analysis.22 Table 4 provides
 descriptive comparison of the treatment and control counties
sing “QuickFacts” data from the U.S. Census. The ﬁrst two columns
escribe the Passport treatment and control counties, followed by
he KHS treatment and control counties. We  also present descrip-
ions of Passport and KHS counties that share a common border.
or both Passport and KHS, the treatment and control counties are
ery similar in terms of measurable county-level characteristics.
bservable differences across the two  regions further motivate
eparate Passport and KHS analyses. Finally, it is interesting to
bserve how similar the Passport and KHS counties are that share a
ommon border. Later we  compare the impact of the different man-
ged care “treatments” in each these two  similar sets of counties.
.2. Empirical model speciﬁcation
The key issue which motivates the instrumental variables
pproach we adopt in this paper is that mobility across Ken-
ucky’s 120 counties is non-trivial, and could be correlated with the
mplementation of Medicaid managed care. Put differently, loca-
ion could be endogenous to health care utilization and Medicaid
enerosity. In the broader literature on welfare beneﬁts, Gelbach
2004) convincingly ﬁnds that among women likely to use wel-
are, movers move to higher-beneﬁt states, and do so earlier in
he life cycle. If one believes that state-to-state moves occur due
o differences in cash welfare generosity, then county-to-county
oves (which are clearly less costly for families) due to differencesn Medicaid generosity may  be an important issue to account for.
To do so, we  argue that county of residence in January 1997
s exogenous to the implementation of the Medicaid managed
f non-continuous enrollment spells are likely to be biased if there are differen-
ial take-up rates in managed care and FFS counties. Although we observe long-run
nsurance status and utilization far more accurately than previous work, by restric-
ing the sample of Kentucky children to those who  were continuously enrolled, it is
ikely that the children are poorer and less mobile than other Medicaid recipients.
n  order to evaluate this formally, we examined data from the Survey of Income and
rogram Participation (SIPP) from 1997 to 1999. We ﬁnd that children continuously
nrolled in Medicaid tend to be more disadvantaged than those with intermittent
edicaid enrollment. Additionally, sources of health insurance coverage for these
hildren when not formally participating in the Medicaid program varied with the
ength of time spent on Medicaid. This suggests that our results based on continu-
usly enrolled children may not be generalizable to the Medicaid population as a
hole.
22 The Passport treatment counties are Breckinridge, Grayson, Larue, and Marion
nd the control counties are Hancock, Ohio, Butler, Edmonson, Hart, Green, and
aylor. The KHS treatment counties are Lincoln, Rockcastle, Jackson, Estill, Powell,
ontgomery, Nicholas, Harrison, and Owen and the control counties are Pulaski,
aurel, Clay, Owsley, Lee, Wolfe, Menifee, Bath, Fleming, Robertson, Bracken, Pendle-
on, Grant, and Gallatin.
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HMOijt = ˇ0 + ˇ1HMO  elig Passport initial countyit + ˇ2Age 6
T
F
S
NFig. 2. The ﬁn
are that occurred in November 1997. This follows the approach
f Aizer et al. (2007) who control for the endogeneity of loca-
ion by assigning Medicaid managed care status based on the ﬁrst
ounty in which a recipient is observed. Thus, we predict managed
are enrollment separately in each region based on the interac-
ion of two variables: time period (pre- or post-implementation)
nd whether the initial county of residence becomes a managed
are county. In other words, in each region we are using managed
are eligibility based on county of residence in January 1997 as an
nstrument for actual managed care enrollment. This exogenous
able 4
inal study county comparisons using the census.
Passport
treatment
Passport
control
KH
Total population, 2006 77 112 14
Average county population 19 16 16
White  (%) 93.9 95.0 96
Living  in same house, 1995 and 2000 (%) 60.7 62.1 58
High  school graduates in 2000 (%) 67.7 64.6 63
Homeownership in 2000 (%) 79.1 78.5 75
Poverty  rate in 2004 (%) 16.7 17.8 19
Counties Breckinridge,
Grayson, Larue,
Marion
Butler,
Edmonson,
Green, Hart,
Hancock, Ohio,
Taylor
Est
Jac
Lin
Mo
Nic
Ow
Ro
ource: U.S. Census QuickFacts data for Kentucky: http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states
otes: Population measured in thousands.dy counties.
ligibility measure should not affect health care utilization except
hrough its effect on actual managed care enrollment.
Our ﬁrst stage models for each region, estimated as linear prob-
bility models, are given below:− 12it + ˇ3Age 13 − 18it + Month Year Dummiesˇ4
+ ˛i + εijt (1a)
S treatment KHS control Passport
counties
(shared border)
KHS counties
(shared border)
7 253 126 119
 18 25 30
.5 96.3 89.3 89.0
.2 59.6 54.2 53.0
.7 63.4 76.9 78.0
.5 76.6 77.1 70.3
.0 20.6 12.1 12.7
ill, Harrison,
kson,
coln,
ntgomery,
holas,
en, Powell,
ckcastle
Bath, Bracken, Clay,
Fleming, Gallatin,
Grant, Laurel, Lee,
Menifee, Owsley,
Pendleton, Pulaski,
Robertson, Wolfe
Henry, Nelson,
Shelby,
Spencer,
Washington
Anderson,
Boyle, Franklin,
Mercer
/21000.html.
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MOijt = ˇ0 + ˇ1HMO  elig KHS initial countyit + ˇ2Age 6 − 12it
+ ˇ3Age 13 − 18it + Month Year Dummiesˇ4 + ˛i + εijt
(1b)
here HMO  represents actual managed care enrollment for child
 in county j at time t, HMO  elig Passport initial county represents
assport eligibility for child i based on initial county of residence
nd current time period (i.e. it equals 1 if the child initially resided in
 Passport county and the time period is November 1997 onward),
MO elig KHS initial county represents KHS eligibility for child i
ased on initial county of residence and current time period, and
onth Year Dummies is a vector containing an indicator for each
f the 30 months (January 1997 to June 1999) in our sample.23
e  also include two indicators for different child age groupings,
hild ﬁxed effects (˛i), and εijt represents a standard error term.
he inclusion of child ﬁxed effects controls for time-invariant
hild characteristics that are not observed in our administrative
ata.
Our primary second stage speciﬁcation, which examines three
ypes health care utilization (professional, outpatient, and inpa-
ient services), is also estimated as a separate linear probability
odel for each region:
ny Monthly Utilizationijt = ˇ0 + ˇ1HMOijt + ˇ2Age 6 − 12it
+ ˇ3Age 13 − 18it + Month Year Dummiesˇ4 + ˛i + εijt (2)
here Any Monthly Utilizationijt is a dummy  variable equal to 1 if
hild i in county j used one of our measures of health care uti-
ization in month t (outpatient, professional, or inpatient), HMO
epresents actual HMO  enrollment in our OLS speciﬁcations and
redicted HMO  enrollment from the ﬁrst stage in our IV speciﬁ-
ations, and the other variables are deﬁned as before.24 We  will
odify this speciﬁcation where needed to accommodate different
easures of utilization, such as a measure of the monthly number
f visits or monthly medical expenditures.
. Data
In order to implement our empirical analysis, we  were provided
ith de-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data by
he Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. As described
bove, for each region our sample consists of children that (i) live
n the region’s treatment or control counties in January 1997 and
ii) are continuously enrolled in Medicaid until June 1999.25 During
hese 30 months, there were no changes in the company managing
he Kentucky Medicaid information systems.
Electronic Data Systems (EDS) was responsible for man-
ging Medicaid information systems for Kentucky from 1994
o 2000 and a new vendor, Unisys, began managing these
atabases in January 2000. We  begin our analysis in January 1997
ecause data prior to that date from EDS were not available.26
23 Recall that a child must be enrolled in Kentucky Medicaid for all 30 months in
rder to be included in our sample. Therefore a child that moves from Kentucky to
nother state would not be included even if their Medicaid coverage across the two
tates was  uninterrupted.
24 For a discussion of the use of linear probability models in two state least squares
stimation see Angrist and Krueger (2001) and Kelejian (1971).
25 Note that we  are not requiring these children to live continuously in one of the
reatment or control counties, only that they maintain Kentucky Medicaid enroll-
ent. Therefore, a child may  live in a Passport treatment county in January 1997
hen move to any other part of the state for the remaining 29 months in our analysis
nd stay in the sample, as long as they maintain their public coverage.
26 A longer time series of pre-reform data would have been preferable, but
iven that we  have micro-level data measured at the monthly level, ten months
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uring transitions to new vendors with new database models,
he medical claims information goes through a testing and ver-
ﬁcation period for about one year. We are not conﬁdent in
he comparability of the new Unisys database with the previ-
us system during this intermediate period, which is why we
nd our analysis in June 1999 (several months before the transi-
ion). The beneﬁts of using this timeframe include the fact that
t spans the reform we  are investigating and we are assured the
hanges in utilization we observe are not being driven by vendor
hanges. The cost is that we cannot observe longer-run utilization
hanges.
After dropping a few children with age discrepancies, we are
eft with 4706 children in our Passport sample (1890 initially in
ne of the 4 Passport treatment counties we  are interested in and
816 initially in one of the 7 control counties) and 13,590 chil-
ren in our KHS sample (4273 initially living in one of the 9 KHS
reatment counties we are interested in and 9317 initially living in
ne of the 14 control counties). Descriptive statistics from our ﬁnal
amples for each region (split into treatment and control sample
ub-categories) are shown in Table 5. Comparing the 1890 children
nitially in a Passport county with the 2816 initially in a border-
ng FFS county, we see that there was a slightly lower probability
f moving across county lines among the Passport children (24
ercent versus 26 percent). On the other hand, there are more
overs among the children initially in a KHS county than their FFS
ontrols. The amount of moving that we observe in both regions
einforces the motivation for our IV approach to control for migra-
ion endogeneity.27 Table 5 reinforces the ﬁnding from Table 4 that
e are comparing extremely homogenous sets of counties within
ach region. The children in our ﬁnal Passport and KHS samples
ppear extremely similar to their FFS controls in terms of demo-
raphics and pre-reform utilization.
Our health care utilization data – which is recorded regard-
ess of whether the payment arrangement is FFS or managed care
 is at the monthly level. Inpatient services are deﬁned to be
ervices delivered in a hospital with an overnight stay, while out-
atient services are services delivered in clinics or hospitals in
hich there is no overnight stay (such as an ER visit). Profes-
ional services typically represent physician services, but could
lso include services provided at locations other than physician
fﬁces, such as dental clinics and public health clinics. The bot-
om of Table 5 presents the monthly utilization rates for each type
f service in the pre-period (January 1997–October 1997) and the
ost-period (November 1997–June 1999) for children in each set
f counties of interest. These simple summary statistics in many
ays tell the entire story. We  see large reductions in outpatient
nd professional utilization for children initially living in the Pass-
ort counties that is not matched by children initially living in
he non-Passport border counties. Children initially living in the
HS counties, while experiencing some reduction in outpatient uti-
ization, actually have a slight increase in professional utilization.
hey tend to look much more similar to children initially in the
on-KHS border counties (i.e., children continuing to receive FFS
edicaid).
f pre-reform utilization data allows us to sufﬁciently investigate the “common
rendsa¨ssumption that is important in any difference-in-differences analysis.
27 These high mobility rates can be corroborated with other data sets. Using the
3,111 unique Kentucky respondents in the 2008 American Community Survey
ACS), we ﬁnd that nearly 16 percent of the sample moved in the last year, with
pproximately 80 percent being within-state moves. Almost half of the within-
tate moves were from one of Kentucky’s 30 Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMA)
o  another. In the ACS, migration rates were higher among children (17 percent
oved), and especially high among poor children (26 percent moved).
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Table 5
Summary statistics using Kentucky administrative data.
Children initially in a
Passport treatment
county
Children initially in a Passport
control county
Children initially in a
KHS treatment county
Children initially in a
KHS control county
# children 1890 2816 4273 9317
#  child months (30 months total) 56,700 84,480 128,190 279,510
%  of children that switched county 23.9 26.0 25.2*** 20.6
Demographics:
Age  on January 1, 1996 7.1* 6.8 7.1 7.1
%  non-white 11.1 9.7 6.5 5.9
%  female 48.9** 45.6 46.7 47.5
Number of siblings 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7
Any  Utilization? (percentage with any monthly Medicaid utilization):
Outpatient Utilization – Pre-reform 9.8%*** 8.6% 10.4%*** 9.5%
Outpatient Utilization – Post-reform 5.2%*** 8.0% 8.2%*** 9.0%
Professional Utilization – Pre-reform 37.6%*** 35.1% 32.2%*** 36.1%
Professional Utilization – Post-reform 24.8%*** 34.3% 32.5%*** 35.5%
Inpatient Utilization – Pre-reform 0.5% 0.6% 0.4%*** 0.5%
Inpatient Utilization – Post-reform 0.3%*** 0.4% 0.3%*** 0.4%
Well  Child Visit Utilization – Pre-reform 3.9%** 3.4% 4.5%*** 5.2%
Well  Child Visit Utilization – Post-reform 3.4%*** 2.3% 2.6%*** 2.8%
Utilization Count? (number of monthly Medicaid visits):
Outpatient visits – Pre-reform 0.126*** 0.107 0.130*** 0.123
Outpatient visits – Post-reform 0.067*** 0.100 0.120** 0.116
Professional visits – Pre-reform 0.699*** 0.604 0.560*** 0.650
Professional visits – Post-reform 0.520*** 0.642 0.604*** 0.684
Inpatient visits – Pre-reform 0.006 0.007 0.004*** 0.006
Inpatient visits – Post-reform 0.003*** 0.005 0.004*** 0.005
Well  Child visits – Pre-reform 0.042** 0.037 0.048*** 0.055
Well  Child visits – Post-reform 0.040*** 0.025 0.031 0.030
Expenditures | Expenditures > 0? (amount of monthly Medicaid spending):
Outpatient spending – Pre-reform $226.09 $247.93 $186.73*** $211.85
Outpatient spending – Post-reform $160.13*** $254.89 $191.87*** $256.31
Professional spending – Pre-reform $120.76*** $150.69 $113.01*** $123.96
Professional spending – Post-reform $182.15* $168.96 $134.57*** $144.26
Inpatient spending – Pre-reform $2551.12 $2526.10 $3194.84 $2750.84
Inpatient spending – Post-reform $2502.06 $2403.74 $2603.59*** $3238.53
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: The pre-reform time period is January 1997 to October 1997 while the post-reform time period is November 1997 to June 1999. The stars represent the results of tests
for  difference in means or proportions between the treatment and control counties within each region.
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. Results
In this section we report our empirical results and in the next
ection we discuss a series of speciﬁcation checks. We  then syn-
hesize the results and discuss how they contribute to the previous
iterature.
.1. Effects of HMO  enrollment on health care utilization –
escriptive evidence
The heterogeneous impact of the two different managed care
treatments” is made especially clear in Figs. 3 and 4. Fig. 3 com-
ares for each of the three types of services differences in the
onthly utilization rate for the 1890 children initially living in a
assport county (labeled “treatment”) to the utilization rate for
he 2816 children initially living in a non-Passport border county
labeled “control”). We  see similar utilization rates in the pre-
eriod for each type of service in both the treatment and control
roups (visual support for the “common trends” assumption) and
hen striking reductions in outpatient and professional utilization
or the Passport treatments relative to their controls. There seems
o be less of a managed care impact on inpatient utilization, but the
xtremely low baseline utilization rate makes the possibility of a
igniﬁcant reduction less likely, as does the fact that inpatient stays
ere still reimbursed on a FFS schedule with a withhold, rather
han with a capitated payment.
m
o
p
pFig. 4 provides the same comparison for our KHS treatment
nd control samples. These graphs clearly tell a different story. We
gain see similar utilization rates between the treatment and con-
rol counties in the pre-period. The KHS pre-period utilization rates
lso appear to be very similar to the Passport pre-period utilization
ates, with slightly lower outpatient and professional rates and a
lightly higher inpatient rate. In the post-period, we see very lit-
le difference between the KHS treatment utilization rates and the
ontrols. Therefore, these graphs suggest a very strong impact of
he managed care treatment associated with the Passport program
nd almost no impact of the managed care treatment associated
ith the KHS program.
.2. Effects of HMO enrollment on health care utilization –
xtensive margin regressions
The top panel of Table 6 presents the results of a series of
egressions based on equation (2) for the Passport region where
he dependent variable in each model is a (0, 1) indicator of any
onthly utilization of professional, outpatient, or inpatient Med-
caid services. The key independent variable of interest is managed
are enrollment (HMO). In order to isolate the effect of the Passport
anaged care program on utilization, each model includes a series
f month year dummies and child ﬁxed effects. The OLS estimate
resented in column 1a suggests that the introduction of the Pass-
ort program led to a statistically signiﬁcant 16 percentage point
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Table  6
Effects of HMO  enrollment on health care utilization – extensive margin.
Passport
Any professional visits? Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
OLS (1a) IV (1b) OLS (2a) IV (2b) OLS (3a) IV (3b)
HMO  enrollment −0.159*** (0.007) −0.174*** (0.007) −0.055 *** (0.003) −0.060*** (0.004) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child  ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate: 36% 36% 9% 9% 0.6% 0.6%
Percent  change: −44% −48% −61% −66% −20% −24%
KHS
Any professional visits? Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
OLS (1c) IV (1d) OLS (2c) IV (2d) OLS (3c) IV (3d)
HMO  enrollment 0.021*** (0.004) 0.012*** (0.004) −0.016*** (0.002) −0.021*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.0005) 0.001 (0.001)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child  ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate: 35% 35% 10% 10% 0.5% 0.5%
Percent  change: 6% 3% −17% −21% 14% 15%
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are in parentheses. Passport regressions include 4706 children followed for 30 months
(N  = 141,180), while the KHS regressions include 13,590 children followed for 30 months (N = 407,700).
*  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
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ecline in the probability of any Medicaid professional utilization
or the children in our sample. This is relative to a monthly pro-
essional utilization rate of 36% in the pre-reform period, thus
epresenting a 44% reduction in the overall monthly probability
f any Medicaid professional utilization. The other OLS estimates
uggest a statistically signiﬁcant 5.5 percentage point decline (61%
eduction) in the monthly probability of any outpatient utilization
nd a more modest 0.1 percentage point decline (20% reduction)
ecline in the monthly probability of any inpatient utilization.
Table 6 also presents results of a similar speciﬁcation estimated
sing our Kentucky Health Select (KHS) sample. The OLS estimate
resented in column 1c suggests that the introduction of the KHS
rogram actually led to a statistically signiﬁcant 2 percentage point
ncrease (6% increase relative to baseline) in the probability of any
edicaid professional utilization. The other OLS estimates suggest
 statistically signiﬁcant 2 percentage point decline (17% relative to
he pre-reform baseline) in the monthly probability of any outpa-
ient utilization and a 0.1 percentage point increase (14% increase)
n the monthly probability of any inpatient utilization.28
Identiﬁcation in the OLS models is achieved through the
ssumption that this Medicaid reform in Kentucky is an exoge-
ous change to insurance type, not driven in a given county by
ome sort of related changes in Medicaid spending/utilization
policy endogeneity) or because of changes in the characteris-
ics of recipients (migration endogeneity).29 In our IV models we
28 Although outpatient and inpatient services were not capitated under the Pass-
ort plan, one would expect that both the capitation of primary care providers and
heir role as gatekeepers, as well as other aspects of managed care, such as utilization
eview, would have an effect on these services. As discussed in Baicker et al. (2013),
he literature on managed care spillover suggests that such effects are important to
onsider.
29 As is argued in Duggan (2004) in the case of California, one could argue in Ken-
ucky that since the planning for the introduction of managed care preceded the
ctual implementation by multiple years, policy endogeneity is unlikely to be a
ajor issue. Moreover, the cost dynamics in these border counties are likely to have
een far less important in policy decisions than the urban centers of the managed
are regions.
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address migration endogeneity by instrumenting actual managed
are enrollment with Passport or KHS eligibility based on initial
ounty of residence.30 Because we ﬁrst observe each child in our
ample in January 1997, our identifying assumption is that their
ounty of residence in January 1997 is exogenous to the implemen-
ation of managed care in November 1997.31 The results reported
n Table 6 illustrate that using an IV approach leaves the coefﬁcient
stimates largely unchanged. This suggests migration endogeneity
s not a major source of bias to our OLS estimates of the impact
f Passport and KHS on health care utilization. Although we  do
bserve children moving, those moves do not appear to be moti-
ated by differences in Medicaid provision across counties.
Our primary results suggest that both Passport and KHS
ecreased outpatient utilization among the children in our sample
long the extensive margin, though Passport was  able to do so to a
reater degree (61% reduction versus 17% reduction). In addition,
oth programs appear to have had a minimal impact on inpatient
are utilization for children along the extensive margin, which is
robably not surprising given the low overall utilization of inpa-
ient services for children. A key difference between the effects of
he two programs is that Passport reduced professional utilization
y 44% along the extensive margin, while KHS actually increased
rofessional utilization by 6%. We  now consider changes along the
ntensive margin and changes in health care spending. Given that
igration endogeneity and policy endogenity do not appear to bias
30 Aizer et al. (2007) take a similar approach to control for the endogeneity of
ocation by assigning managed care status to each woman in their sample based on
he  ﬁrst county in which she is observed.
31 Appendix Table A2 presents the results of the ﬁrst stage regressions in which
assport or KHS eligibility based on initial county of residence is used to predict
ctual managed care enrollment (HMO). The instrument is clearly a very strong
redictor of actual managed care enrollment with a marginal managed care par-
icipation rate of 69 percent for Passport and 79 percent for KHS. The estimated
arginal take-up rate is not 100 percent in either case because of difﬁculty in
easuring managed care enrollment in the ﬁrst 4 months of the reform and some
hildren moving across county lines, potentially into the adjacent managed care
rea.
58 J. Marton et al. / Journal of Health Economics 36 (2014) 47–68
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
Passport  % Monthly  Out pa ent Uli zaon (Jan  1997 -June  1999)  
Control
Treatment
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
45.00%
50.00%
Passport % Monthly Professional Ulizaon (Jan 1997-June 1999) 
Control
Treat ment
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
1.40%
Passport  % Monthly  In pa ent Uli zaon (Jan  1997 -June  1999)  
Control
Treat ment
o
a
6
i
m
f
t
l
(
a
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
14.00%
Region 5 % Mo nth ly Outpa ent Uli zao n (Jan  1997 -June  1999)  
Control
Treatment
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
45.00%
50.00%
Region 5 % Monthly Professional Ulizaon (Jan 1997-June 1999) 
Control
Treat ment
0.00%
0.10%
0.20%
0.30%
0.40%
0.50%
0.60%
0.70%
0.80%
0.90%
Region 5 % Mo nth ly In pa ent Uli zaon (Jan  1997 -June  1999)  
Control
Treat ment
m
K
w
d
oFig. 3. Child healthcare utilization before and after Passport.
ur results, we do not instrument for HMO  status in our subsequent
nalysis.32
.3. Effects of HMO  enrollment on health care utilization –
ntensive margin regressions
In order to analyze changes along the intensive margin, we
odify Eq. (2) by replacing the dependent variable with a countor the number of monthly professional, outpatient, or inpa-
ient visits. Since each of these dependent variables includes a
arge number of zeros, we estimate these regressions as Poisson
32 This ﬁnding with respect to migration endogeneity mirrors the results of a study
Schwartz and Sommers, 2014) that investigates changes in state-to-state migration
fter recent public insurance expansions.
i
n
t
K
o
w
e
rFig. 4. Child healthcare utilization before and after KHS.
odels. The results of the Poisson models for both Passport and
HS are given in Table 7, where the marginal effects associated
ith HMO  enrollment are presented for each outcome of interest.
Similar to the impact along the extensive margin, the intro-
uction of the Passport program led to reductions in the number
f monthly professional, outpatient, and inpatient visits along the
ntensive margin, with all three reductions being statistically sig-
iﬁcant in this case. We see no statistically signiﬁcant change in
he number of outpatient or inpatient visits associated with the
HS plan, but a statistically signiﬁcant increase in the number
f monthly professional visits. Thus, the KHS plan was  associated
ith increases in professional visits along both the intensive and
xtensive margin, while the Passport plan was associated with
eductions in professional visits along both margins.
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Table  7
Effects of HMO  enrollment on health care utilization – intensive margin.
Passport
Number of professional visits (1a) Number of outpatient visits (2a) Number of inpatient visits (3a)
HMO  enrollment −0.398*** (0.033) −0.650 *** (0.059) −0.210** (0.106)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes
Child  ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes
Sample size: 137,910 100,530 13,680
KHS
Number of professional visits (1b) Number of outpatient visits (2b) Number of inpatient visits (3b)
HMO  Enrollment 0.059** (0.023) 0.002 (0.025) 0.086 (0.095)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes
Child ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes
Sample size: 397,140 302,550 35,790
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: These regressions are all estimated as Poisson models and include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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patients do not receive some of the appropriate or necessary care
they were getting under FFS. Above we examined a particular type
of service associated with such concerns (well child visits). Now we Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
.4. Effect of HMO  enrollment on health care spending
Next we turn our attention to the effects of HMO  enrollment
n monthly health care spending. The results reported in Table 6
an be viewed as changes in health care spending along the exten-
ive margin. In other words, those results tell us whether or not
anaged care had an impact on the likelihood that an enrollee had
ny monthly health care expenditure. The estimates presented in
able 8 focus on the intensive margin; those months in which a
atient had positive expenditures. These results come from a mod-
ﬁed version of Eq. (2) where the dependent variable is the log of
onthly spending on professional, outpatient, or inpatient care,
onditional on having non-zero monthly spending. We estimate
ach equation using OLS. Table 8 suggests that both programs led
o statistically signiﬁcant reductions in monthly health care spend-
ng, conditional on non-zero monthly spending. The magnitude of
he effect is larger for Passport than KHS.
We also take an alternate approach to model monthly health
are spending that allows us to determine where on the distribu-
ion of medical spending any observed reductions in utilization are
oming from. For example, is the 61% reduction in the monthly
robability of consuming any outpatient services observed in the
assport region achieved by reducing utilization among “heavy”
sers of outpatient services? The regressions reported in Table 9
ddress this question for outpatient and professional services in
oth the Passport and KHS regions. We  create new dependent
ariables equal to 1 in months where the child’s professional or
utpatient Medicaid spending exceed the 50th percentile of the
espective monthly spending distribution (conditional on having
ositive spending). In the ﬁrst column, the dependent variable
quals 1 in a given month if a child has professional service
pending/claims above $50 (approximately the 50th percentile
f professional spending), and in second column the dependent
ariable equals 1 if in a given month a child has outpatient
pending/claims above $100 (approximately the 50th percentile
f outpatient spending).
Table 9 reports that Passport led to a 92% reduction in the prob-
bility of having monthly outpatient spending above $100. This
uggests a far stronger impact of Passport on outpatient utiliza-
ion for those with relatively high outpatient spending/claims. For
rofessional services we see that Passport focuses on the left tail of
he distribution. Passport leads to a 32% reduction in the probability
f having any monthly professional spending above $50, as com-
ared to a 44% reduction in the probability of having any monthly
9
arofessional spending (Table 6). For KHS, more of the action for
oth outpatient and professional spending is coming from high
penders, though the interpretation differs because the signs differ.
he reduction in the overall probability of any monthly outpatient
pending for KHS is driven more strongly by reductions among the
igh spenders, while the increase in the overall probability of any
onthly professional spending is being driven more strongly by
ncreases among the high spenders.
.5. Effect of HMO enrollment on well child utilization – extensive
nd intensive margins
While our previous results examine broad categories of uti-
ization, one speciﬁc type of service is of particular interest, well
hild ofﬁce visits.33 If managed or Accountable Care Organizations
ant to reduce utilization through improvements in preventive
are, then we would expect them to promote such ofﬁce visits.
here may  be some concern, however, that the incentives created
y the Passport capitation of primary care providers may reduce
uch visits.
Table 10 examines the impact of the introduction of Passport
nd KHS on monthly well child utilization along both the extensive
nd intensive margins. Both plans increased both the probability
f having a monthly well child visit (extensive margin) as well as
he number of well child visits received (intensive margin). The
agnitudes of the increases are larger for Passport than for KHS. In
articular, the introduction of Passport led to a 31% increase in the
robability of having a well child visit in a particular month, while
he introduction of the KHS plan led to a 9% increase.
.6. Effect of HMO  enrollment on health outcomes
Our Passport results provide compelling evidence that utiliza-
ion can be reduced through the high-powered incentives provided
n typical managed care arrangements. One  common criticism,
owever, is that this reduction in utilization comes at a real cost:33 We deﬁne well child visits as visits identiﬁed with CPT codes 99382, 99393,
9392, 99393 and IDC-9 codes V20.2, V70.0, V70.3, V70.5, V70.6, V70.8, and V70.9,
s  suggested by the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA).
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Table 8
Effects of HMO  enrollment on health care spending (conditional on positive monthly spending).
Passport
Log spending on professional visits (1a) Log spending on outpatient visits (2a) Log spending on inpatient visits (3a)
HMO  enrollment −0.19*** (0.03) −1.26*** (0.07) −0.82** (0.27)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes
Child ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes
Sample size: 45,690 10,719 614
Avg.  monthly spending: $160.21 $231.16 $2476.60
Marginal effect: −17% −72% −56%
KHS
Log spending on professional visits (1b) Log spending on outpatient visits (2b) Log spending on inpatient visits (3b)
HMO  enrollment −0.10*** (0.02) −0.36*** (0.03) −0.38* (0.20)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes
Child ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes
Sample size: 141,377 37,029 1714
Avg.  monthly spending: $134.48 $225.09 $2987.70
Marginal effect: −9% −30% −31%
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: These regressions are estimated using OLS and include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
Table 9
Effects of HMO  enrollment on large health care spenders.
Passport
Indicator for expenditure of $50 or more
on professional visits during month
Indicator for expenditure of $100 or more
on outpatient visits during month
HMO  −0.060*** (0.005) −0.050*** (0.002)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes
Child ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate: 18.7% 4.3%
Percent change: −32% −92%
KHS
Indicator for expenditure of $50 or more
on professional visits during month
Indicator for expenditure of $100 or more
on outpatient visits during month
HMO  0.016*** (0.002) −0.019*** (0.001)
30  Month–Year Dummies? Yes Yes
Child Fixed Effects? Yes Yes
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate: 17.34% 5.11%
Percent change: 9% −37%
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: Sample includes all 4706 children from the Passport sample, for all 30 months.
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* Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
xamine a particular type of enrollee, children with asthma. If the
tilization reductions in Passport we observe imply poorer primary
are for this vulnerable population, we would expect a higher hos-
italization rate after Passport is implemented among this group
Aizer and Currie, 2002; Aizer, 2007).
Table 11A provides regression results on utilization for various
roupings of Kentucky counties. The ﬁrst set of columns breaks out
he 4706 children from the 4 treatment and 7 control counties for
assport into 323 asthmatic children and 4383 others.34 As in the
ull sample, we see no statistically signiﬁcant change in inpatient
tilization for asthmatics along the extensive margin. Asthmatics
lso have similar changes in outpatient and professional utilization.
34 We deﬁne an asthmatic as a child with at least one occurrence of the ICD-9 code
ssociated with asthma (493) in the 10 month pre-reform time period.
o
c
t
n
B
c
eor comparative purposes, the second column reports the regres-
ion results for the non-asthmatic children.
Because the asthmatic sample size is relatively small, we
xpanded the sample in two  ways. First, we expand the sample to
nclude all 30 month enrolled children in all 16 Passport counties
s the treatment group and all 30 month enrolled children in all
9 Region 4 counties to the south (see Fig. 1) as the control group.
s the second set of columns show, this increases the number of
sthmatics to 2027, but the basic conclusions do not change. Sec-
nd, we  also expand the sample by including all 30 month enrolled
hildren in Regions 4 (19 counties) and 2 (12 counties) as the con-
rol group. The third set of columns show that this increases the
umber of asthmatics to 2447. Again the results do not change.
ecause we  ﬁnd that hospitalizations did not go up for asthmatic
hildren, we take this as suggestive, but certainly not conclusive,
vidence that there were not detrimental health impacts associated
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Table  10
Effects of HMO  enrollment on well child utilization – intensive and extensive margins.
Passport
Any well child visits? (1a) Number of well child visits (1b)
HMO  enrollment 0.011*** (0.002) 0.287*** (0.048)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes
Child ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes
Sample size: 141,180 73,020
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate 4%
Percent change: 31%
KHS
Any well child visits? (2a) Number of well child visits (2b)
HMO  enrollment 0.004*** (0.001) 0.127*** (0.024)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes
Child ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes
Sample size: 407,700 226,770
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate 5%
Percent change: 9%
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age. The regressions on the left are estimated as linear probability models using OLS and the regressions on
the  right are estimated as Poisson models. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
**  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
Table 11A
The impact of passport managed care on asthmatic children and all other children.
(1) Original treatment and control
counties
(2) All 16 Passport counties versus
all 19 region 4 counties
(3) All 16 Passport counties versus
all 19 region 2 and all 12 region 4
counties
Asthmatic children All other children Asthmatic children All other children Asthmatic children All other children
Any professional visits? −0.238*** (0.019) −0.155*** (0.005) −0.130*** (0.007) −0.071*** (0.001) −0.141*** (0.006) −0.073*** (0.001)
Baseline rate: 57% 35% 54% 29% 55% 30%
Percent  change: −42% −44% −24% −24% −26% −24%
Any  outpatient visits? −0.107*** (0.013) −0.052*** (0.003) −0.051*** (0.005) −0.030*** (0.001) −0.056*** (0.004) −0.032*** (0.001)
Baseline rate: 17% 8% 17% 7% 17% 7%
Percent  change: −63% −65% −30% −43% −33% −46%
Any  inpatient visits? −0.0001 (0.005) −0.0014*** (0.001) −0.004** (0.002) −0.001*** (0.0002) −0.003* (0.002) −0.001*** (0.0002)
Baseline rate: 3.0% 0.4% 2.8% 0.4% 2.8% 0.4%
Percent  change: −.4% −36% −16% −16% −11% −17%
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: The OLS regressions in this table estimate similar models to those in Table 6. The ﬁrst set of results divides the sample of 4706 children into asthmatic children
(N  = 323), and all others (N = 4383). The second set of results – with a larger geographic coverage – examines 2027 asthmatic children compared to 31,305 other children.
The  ﬁnal set of results examines 2447 asthmatic children compared to 38,840 other children. Three stars, two stars, and one star imply statistically signiﬁcant parameter
estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 11B
The impact of KHS managed care on asthmatic children and all other children.
(1) Original treatment and control
counties
(2) All 16 KHS counties versus all
33 region 7 and 8 counties
(3) All 16 KHS Counties versus all
39 region 6, 7 and 8 counties
Asthmatic children All other children Asthmatic children All other children Asthmatic children All other children
Any professional visits? 0.021 (0.022) 0.021*** (0.004) −0.009 (0.011) 0.004 (0.002) −0.008 (0.011) 0.004* (0.002)
Baseline  rate: 59% 34% 58% 33% 58% 33%
Percent change: 4% 6% −2% 1% −1% 1%
Any  Outpatient Visits? −0.045*** (0.014) −0.015*** (0.002) −0.020*** (0.006) −0.008*** (0.001) −0.019*** (0.006) −0.008*** (0.001)
Baseline rate: 21% 9% 21% 10% 21% 10%
Percent change: −21% −16% −10% −8% −9% −8%
Any  Inpatient Visits? −0.0006 (0.004) 0.0007 (0.0004) 0.0079*** (0.0020) 0.0006** (0.0003) 0.0074*** (0.002) 0.0006** (0.0002)
Baseline rate: 2.0% 0.4% 3.3% 0.5% 3.3% 0.5%
Percent change: −3% 16% 24% 12% 23% 11%
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Notes: The OLS regressions in this table
estimate similar models to those in Table 6. The ﬁrst set of results divides the sample of 13,590 children into asthmatic children (N = 664), and all others (N = 12,926). The
second  set of results – with a larger geographic coverage – examines 4168 asthmatic children compared to 47,374 other children. The ﬁnal set of results examines 4481
asthmatic children compared to 51,833 other children.
* Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
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Table 12
Speciﬁcation check – allow for partial enrollment effects of HMO enrollment on health care utilization – extensive margin.
Passport
Any professional visits? Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
OLS (1a) IV (1b) OLS (2a) IV (2b) OLS (3a) IV (3b)
HMO enrollment −0.141*** (0.005) −0.158*** (0.005) −0.047*** (0.003) −0.052*** (0.003) −0.0001 (0.001) 0.0003 (0.001)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child  ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate: 35% 35% 9% 9% 0.7% 0.7%
Percent  change: −40% −45% −52% −57% −1% 4%
KHS
Any professional visits? Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
OLS (1c) IV (1d) OLS (2c) IV (2d) OLS (3c) IV (3d)
HMO enrollment 0.013*** (0.003) 0.007** (0.003) −0.014*** (0.002) −0.019*** (0.002) 0.0003 (0.0004) 0.0004 (0.0005)
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child  ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate: 34% 34% 10% 10% 0.6% 0.6%
Percent  change: 4% 2% −14% −19% 5% 7%
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are in parentheses. Passport regressions include 8693 children followed for up to
30  months (N = 234,058), while the KHS regressions include 23,825 children followed for up to 30 months (N = 646,820).
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a Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
ith Passport utilization reductions. Table 11B reports the results
f similar analysis for the KHS plan. Splitting our initial KHS sam-
le into asthmatics and non-asthmatics also shows no statistically
igniﬁcant change in inpatient admissions for asthmatic children.
 full analysis of the health impacts of managed care is beyond the
cope of this paper, but will be the subject of future research.
. Speciﬁcation checks
In this section we consider a variety of speciﬁcation checks to
est the robustness of our primary results. We  expand our sample
y allowing for children that were partially enrolled and by allow-
ng for children that live in non-border counties. We  then restrict
ur sample to a one year post-reform timeframe. Next we  formally
est the common trends assumption associated with difference-
n-differences analysis. We  then examine utilization changes for
hildren that live on the Passport – KHS border and conclude by
onsidering changes in provider participation in Medicaid.
.1. Allow for partial enrollment
Table 12 replicates our primary speciﬁcations estimated in
able 6 with an expanded sample that allows for children that were
ot enrolled in Medicaid for all 30 months in our data. This increases
he number of children in the Passport analysis from 4706 chil-
ren to 8693 children and the KHS sample from 13,590 children to
3,825 children. Focusing on the OLS results, we see that expand-
ng the sample in this way  does not change our primary results.
assport still led to large reductions in professional and outpatient
tilization, while KHS led to a more modest reduction in outpatient
tilization and an increase in professional utilization. Neither plan
ad a statistically signiﬁcant impact on inpatient utilization. This
mplies that our primary results are not being driven by selection
nto continuous Medicaid coverage over our timeframe..2. Allow for non-border counties
Next we consider how our conclusions would change if we  used
 larger, but more geographically diverse sample. Recall that our
r
2
u
mPassport experiment” used only four of sixteen counties in Region
 for the treatment group, as well as seven contiguous counties out-
ide of Region 3 for the control group. The “KHS experiment” used
ine of twenty-one counties in Region 5 for the treatment group,
nd fourteen counties outside of Region 5 for the control group.
n addition, given the differences in plan design, the managed care
treatment” was fundamentally different in the two  regions.
Table 13 shows the results of expanding the sample using the
ame OLS models that were used in Table 6 (the coefﬁcients from
hat table are presented in the ﬁrst two  rows of Table 13 as refer-
nce). We  begin by combining the treatment regions, estimating
he effect of managed care without regard to the underlying dif-
erences between the two regions. As might be expected, the
reatment effect of managed care is essentially a weighted average
f the treatment effects in the two  managed care regions. Over-
ll, professional utilization falls by 4 percentage points, far smaller
han the 16 percentage point drop in the Passport region, but a sub-
tantially larger drop than the 2 percentage point increase observed
n the KHS region. The conclusions for outpatient utilization mir-
or those for professional utilization, while the effect on inpatient
tilization is in all cases insigniﬁcant.
We conclude that ignoring the underlying incentives created
y different forms of managed/accountable care can lead to very
ifferent conclusions about the magnitude of its effect on utiliza-
ion. This implies that studies that ignore such heterogeneity across
COs or ACOs, which is often the case in the literature, may  end
p with biased estimates of the impact of such ﬁnancing and care
rovision arrangements.
Next, we  expand our sample to include continuously-enrolled
hildren in all Region 3 and Region 5 counties as the treatment
roup, and all continuously-enrolled children in the other six
egions as the control group. It should be clear from our previ-
us comparison of the eight regions (Table 3) that doing so makes
he treatment and control groups far more heterogeneous. Rel-
tive to the approach of focusing on geographically contiguous
egions, our estimated impacts of managed care are roughly 15 to
0 percent smaller. We  interpret this difference as suggesting that
n-modeled, omitted factors are correlated with both the imple-
entation of managed care and utilization in the larger sample; for
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Table  13
Speciﬁcation check – allow for non-border counties effects of HMO  enrollment on health care utilization – extensive margin.
Any professional visits? Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
HMO  enrollment in Passport −0.159*** (0.007) −0.055*** (0.003) −0.001 (0.001)
HMO  enrollment in KHS 0.021*** (0.004) −0.061*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.0005)
HMO  enrollment – Combined Regions −0.035*** (0.004) −0.028*** (0.002) 0.0001 (0.0004)
HMO  enrollment – All 120 Counties, Combined Regions −0.043*** (0.001) −0.022*** (0.001) 0.0002 (0.0002)
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: All models estimated using our OLS speciﬁcation. The results for Passport and KHS are for the speciﬁcation in Table 6. There are 4706 observations for the Passport
speciﬁcation, 13,590 for the KHS speciﬁcation, 18,296 for the Combined Regions speciﬁcation, and 101,649 for the All Counties, Combined Regions speciﬁcation.
*  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
*
e
d
a
7
i
i
a
r
m
p
m
O
m
s
u
s
w
t
t
p
l
n
7
t
i
r
d
p
f
t
j
n
T
T
S
S
N
(
*
**  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
xample, it is possible that utilization trends in urban areas trended
ifferently over time than utilization in rural areas, and the urban
reas also adopted managed care.
.3. Restrict sample to one year post-reform timeframe
Fig. 3 suggests a dip in outpatient utilization one year after the
mplementation of the Passport program (November 1998) that
s larger than the utilization reduction that occurs immediately
fter Passport began operating. We  investigate the sensitivity of our
esults to this dip by restricting the post-reform timeframe in the
odels reported in Table 6 to 12 months. Thus for these models the
re-reform timeframe is January 1997 through October 1997 (10
onths) and the post-reform timeframe is November 1997 through
ctober 1998 (12 months).
Table 14 shows that restricting the post-reform timeframe to 12
onths reduces the magnitude of the Passport reduction in profes-
ional utilization from 44% to 38% and the reduction in outpatient
tilization from 61% to 29%. In both cases the results for profes-
ional and outpatient services are highly statistically signiﬁcant,
hile the estimated impact on inpatient utilization is not. Restric-
ing the post-reform timeframe in this way makes almost no change
o the KHS results. Therefore, restricting attention to one year
f
o
f
r
able 14
peciﬁcation check – restrict post-reform timeframe to 12 months effects of HMO  enrollm
Passport
Any professional visits? 
OLS (1a) IV (1b) 
HMO  enrollment −0.139*** (0.007) −0.147*** (0.009) 
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes 
Child  ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes 
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate: 36% 36% 
Percent  change: −38% −41% 
KHS
Any professional visits? 
OLS (1c) IV (1d) 
HMO  enrollment 0.021*** (0.004) 0.015*** (0.005) 
30  month–year dummies? Yes Yes 
Child  ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes 
Pre-reform avg. monthly utilization rate: 35% 35% 
Percent  change: 6% 4% 
ource: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentu
otes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are i
N  = 103,532), while the KHS regressions include 13,590 children followed for 22 months
 Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
*  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.ost-reform does not change our primary result: Passport led to
arge reductions in professional and outpatient services that were
ot matched by the KHS plan.
.4. Test for common trends in the pre-period
In order to formally test whether or not there were differen-
ial utilization trends between the treatment and control counties
n each region prior to the reform, we re-estimated the models
eported in Table 6 with a treatment indicator interacted with
ummies for each of the ﬁrst eight months of the pre-reform time
eriod. As shown in Table 15, in our Passport models for pro-
essional, outpatient, and inpatient utilization we  cannot reject
he null hypothesis that these pre-reform interaction terms are
ointly equal to zero. In our KHS models we cannot reject this same
ull hypothesis in our outpatient and inpatient utilization models.
here does seem to be some evidence of differential trends in pro-
essional utilization. Overall these results formalize what we can
bserve in Figs. 3 and 4, that there do not appear to be major dif-
erential utilization trends in the pre-reform time period for either
egion.
ent on health care utilization – extensive margin.
Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
OLS (2a) IV (2b) OLS (3a) IV (3b)
−0.026 *** (0.004) −0.031*** (0.006) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
9% 9% 0.6% 0.6%
−29% −35% 20% 10%
Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
OLS (2c) IV (2d) OLS (3c) IV (3d)
−0.019*** (0.002) −0.022*** (0.003) 0.0004 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
10% 10% 0.5% 0.5%
−19% −22% 9% 13%
cky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
n parentheses. Passport regressions include 4706 children followed for 22 months
 (N = 298,980).
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Table 15
Speciﬁcation check – testing common pre-reform trends assumption effects of HMO  enrollment on health care utilization – extensive margin.
Passport
Any professional visits? Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
1(a)  2(a) 3(a)
HMO enrollment −0.159*** −0.055*** −0.001
(0.008) (0.004) (0.001)
Treatment × month 1 interaction −0.012 −0.006 0.001
(0.014) (0.008) (0.003)
Treatment × month 2 interaction 0.012 −0.002 −0.004
(0.015) (0.009) (0.003)
Treatment × month 3 interaction 0.014 0.014 0.0000
(0.014) (0.009) (0.002)
Treatment × month4 interaction 0.019 0.010 −0.002
(0.014) (0.009) (0.002)
Treatment × month 5 interaction 0.010 −0.004 0.004
(0.014) (0.009) (0.002)
Treatment × month 6 interaction −0.025* 0.0002 0.001
(0.014) (0.008) (0.002)
Treatment × month 7 interaction −0.011 0.001 0.003*
(0.014) (0.009) (0.002)
Treatment × month 8 interaction −0.013 −0.006 −0.002
(0.014) (0.008) (0.002)
F  test that all interactions are equal to 0:
Fstat 1.41 0.72 1.48
Pvalue  0.1849 0.6722 0.1583
KHS
Any professional visits? Any outpatient visits? Any inpatient visits?
1(b)  2(b) 3(b)
HMO enrollment 0.0003 −0.015*** 0.029***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
Treatment × month 1 interaction −0.0023* −0.004 0.006
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009)
Treatment × month 2 interaction −0.0002 0.004 0.014
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009)
Treatment × month 3 interaction −0.0033** −0.001 0.024*
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009)
Treatment × month4 interaction 0.00001 0.003 0.021**
(0.002) (0.006) (0.009)
Treatment × month 5 interaction −0.0005 0.001 −0.005
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009)
Treatment × month 6 interaction −0.0001 0.0005 0.028***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.009)
Treatment × month 7 interaction 0.0005 0.009 0.028***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.009)
Treatment × month 8 interaction 0.0003 0.008 −0.009
(0.001) (0.005) (0.009)
F  test that all interactions are equal to 0:
Fstat 1.12 0.7 3.98
Pvalue  0.3452 0.6924 0.0001
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age and interaction terms between indicators for each of the ﬁrst eight months in the data (pre-reform time
period)  and an indicator for those in the treatment group in each region. Standard errors are in parentheses. Passport regressions include 4706 children followed for 30
months (N = 141,180), while the KHS regressions include 13,590 children followed for 30 months (N = 407,700).
* Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
***
7
b
c
i
M
t
t
r
s
s
t
a
s
r
7Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
.5. Comparing treated border counties
As Fig. 1 illustrates, the Passport and KHS regions also share a
order, meaning that as an additional speciﬁcation check we  can
ompare utilization pre- and post-reform for 5 Passport (Wash-
ngton, Nelson, Spencer, Shelby, and Henry) and 4 KHS (Boyle,
ercer, Anderson, and Franklin) counties that were excluded fromhe previous analysis. The ﬁnal two columns of Table 4 suggest that
hese counties are extremely similar, other than the managed care
egion they were assigned to. Fig. 5 presents outpatient, profes-
ional, and inpatient utilization comparisons. The ﬁgure suggests
A
aimilar utilization rates in both sets of counties prior to the reform,
hen stronger utilization reductions in the Passport counties rel-
tive to their KHS neighbors. These graphs therefore lend further
upport to the notion that the Passport plan was better able to
educe utilization than the KHS plan.
.6. Provider participationOur ﬁnal speciﬁcation check examines provider participation.
re the reductions in Passport utilization coming from reduced
ccess to health care (i.e., fewer providers participating in the
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tion, the marginal revenue associated with an additional visit was
zero for Passport physicians. In contrast, KHS attempted to incen-Fig. 5. Healthcare utilization in bordering Passport and KHS counties.
rogram), rather than more efﬁcient delivery of services? A man-
ged care network would likely restrict the number of doctors,
ut were those restrictions so severe as to cause the reduction we
bserve? From the universe of Medicaid recipients in the treat-
ent/control counties, we are able to extract unique provider
dentiﬁers. Fig. 6A illustrates that although the number of Med-
caid providers did not grow in the Passport counties (as they did
n the control counties), they did not shrink either. In addition, the
gure shows that the number of providers did not abruptly change
ith the implementation of managed care, even though utilization
id. The differences in levels seem to reﬂect population size differ-
nces. Fig. 6B shows a similar pattern for the KHS plan. As a result,
t is difﬁcult to believe that the sharp drop in utilization we  observe
ithin Passport is the result of reduced access.
t
wig. 6. (A) Monthly count of unique medicaid provider identiﬁers in passport (treat-
ent) and non-passport (control) counties. (B) Monthly count of unique medicaid
rovider identiﬁers in KHS (treatment) and non-KHS (control) counties.
. Discussion and conclusion
The unique introduction of managed care in the Kentucky Med-
caid program allows us to document and analyze organizational
ifferences between two Medicaid managed care plans that started
t the same time, operated in close proximity to one another, and
erved relatively homogeneous sets of enrollees. In particular, we
ocus on differences in physician reimbursement systems used by
he two plans because such reimbursement systems are, accord-
ng to Copper and Rebitzer (2002), often considered a “black box
hose internal operation is obscured from view.” We  also con-
ider differences in other administrative functions between the
wo plans. Overall, we  ﬁnd that Passport’s choices of using capi-
ation to reimburse primary care physicians and contracting out
ome other basic managed care administrative responsibilities to
e more effective in reducing utilization than KHS’s choices to use a
odiﬁed FFS reimbursement scheme and handle all administrative
esponsibilities in house.
Whether utilization is measured along the extensive (probabil-
ty of any monthly visits) or intensive margin (number of monthly
isits or monthly expenditure), we ﬁnd that the Passport “capi-
ated” program led to signiﬁcant reductions in professional and
utpatient utilization not matched by the KHS “withhold” plan.
n fact, professional utilization actually increased within the KHS
withhold” plan. This can likely be explained by differences in the
nancial incentives PCPs within each plan faced. Due to capita-ivize physicians through the use FFS reimbursement with a group
ithhold. As predicted by the literature on optimal group size (GRT
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anonymous referees for their valuable comments. We  would also
like to thank Gao Liu, Erin Coffman, T.J. Christian, Jamie Turner, and
Subha Basu for their work as research assistants. Any errors are,6 J. Marton et al. / Journal of H
2004)), the typical group size of 20 that was used by the KHS “with-
old” plan was much too big to serve as an effective deterrent to
ree-riding.
Given the magnitude of the utilization reductions we  observe
ithin the Passport “capitated” program, we investigated a host of
easons, besides changes in physician ﬁnancial incentives, which
ould explain such reductions. First, we examined whether or not
ccess to Medicaid-participating physicians fell within the Passport
egion. We  found that the number of providers serving our Passport
capitated” sample remained extremely steady during our 36-
onth timeframe. Second, we considered whether or not particular
ervices of interest (well child visits) or particular populations of
nterest (asthmatic children) where differentially targeted within
he Passport “capitated” plan. We  found no change in hospitaliza-
ion rates for asthmatic children and observed an increase in well
hild visit utilization, consistent with the idea that managed care
romotes preventive services.
A third concern would be that the utilization reductions we
bserve were driven by changes in reporting rather than actual
eductions in service provision. Unlike the California transition
o Medicaid managed care (Aizer et al., 2007; Duggan, 2004),
roviders in Kentucky were required to report encounter data and
ere given a modest ﬁnancial incentive to do so. From the per-
pective of the plans, both Passport and KHS had strong incentives
o measure their provision of care as such information would be
seful in negotiating future capitation rates with the state.
One may  also wonder if there are ﬂaws in our “quasi-
xperimental” research design. Relative to other investigations
f Medicaid managed care we would argue we have a number
f advantages. First, unlike within California, enrollment in man-
ged care in Kentucky was mandatory for virtually all children in
he “treatment” counties. Second, as shown, our “treatment” and
control” counties are extremely balanced on observable character-
stics. Third, the implications of our story stand up to all robustness
hecks that we investigated – including partial Medicaid spells,
xpanding to a broader set of counties, testing pre-existing trends,
tc.
Thus, at the end of the day, we then are left with the most likely
tory: ﬁnancial incentives for physicians – which are transparently
aid out in the Kentucky context but not others – matters greatly
or utilization. The utilization declines found in our study stand
n contrast with the zero or positive expenditure ﬁndings in other
edicaid managed care studies (Duggan, 2004; Herring and Adams,
011; Duggan and Hayford, 2013). Although there are many dif-
erences between the studies, including the nature of the reforms
nd populations being analyzed, this contrast may  highlight the
mportance of the distinction between true resource utilization (Q)
nd negotiated reimbursement levels (P) that impact expenditures
P × Q).
That being said, there is more work that needs to be done to bet-
er understand the impact of Medicaid managed care. This paper
ocuses on a speciﬁc group of enrollees (children) and broad meas-
res of utilization (inpatient, outpatient, and professional) within
ne state (Kentucky), which raises potential concerns regarding
xternal validity.35 We  can address this to some degree in future
ork by using our identiﬁcation strategy to do an analysis of the
mpact managed care on adult Medicaid enrollees in Kentucky or
ocus on more speciﬁc types of services, such as prescription drugs.
n particular, we  would not want to extrapolate our current ﬁndings
ith respect to the health outcomes for asthmatic children to other
35 Of course, focusing on children is not that restrictive because over half of Med-
caid recipients are children. For more information, see: http://www.medicaid.gov/
edicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Population/By-population.html.
m
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ypes of Medicaid recipients, such as pregnant women or those
ually eligible for Medicare, or other types of vulnerable children,
uch as newborns.
Even if we answered every possible question about Medicaid
anaged care in the Kentucky context, it is not necessarily clear
ow well these ﬁndings would translate to other states. For exam-
le, Kentucky ranks 45th out of 50 states in overall health according
o the United Health Foundation, with above average rates of pre-
entable hospitalizations, obesity, smoking, infant mortality, and
hildren in poverty, among other measures.36 On the other hand,
s is often the case with research involving state Medicaid pro-
rams, there is a trade-off between the number of states included
n the analysis and the ability to fully understand the details of the
eforms of interest in order to develop a strong research design that
llows for causal inference. This suggests the need for more work
n Medicaid-related topics to come from other states. State Med-
caid expansions under the ACA will no doubt be a catalyst for such
ork in the future.
Despite these limitations, our results should be of inter-
st to policymakers considering Medicaid managed care as a
ost-containment measure, given the speciﬁc ﬁscal challenge of
edicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Such
nancial difﬁculties have recently led to further transition toward
edicaid managed care in Kentucky. In November 2011, Ken-
ucky expanded Medicaid managed care to the 104 non-Passport
ounties.37 The expansion is projected to save the program $1.3
illion. In addition, Florida recently approved a massive overhaul
f its Medicaid system, which will shift hundreds of thousands of
edicaid recipients into HMOs. Plan sponsor, Representative Rob
chenck (R-Spring Hill, FL), said “We  get to save billions of dollars,
nd we  get to deliver better health care.”38 It is anticipated that
edicaid managed care will be available in all areas of Florida by
ctober 2014.39 Finally, Governor Sam Brownback announced in
ate 2011 a massive restructuring of Kansas Medicaid, called Kan-
are. KanCare was implemented in January 2013, is projected to
ave $853.1 million during its ﬁrst ﬁve years, and would make
ansas the only state with managed care companies providing care
tatewide to all Medicaid enrollees.40 Our analysis suggests that
p front plan design decisions, such as the choice of reimburse-
ent mechanism for physicians, may  in large part determine the
ventual success or failure of any expansions of managed care.
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Table  A1
Services covered by the state capitation payments to the plans.
Capitated services Excluded services
Inpatient hospital services Dental services Mental Hospitals
Outpatient hospital services Medical transportation Psychiatrists
Urgent and emergency services EPSDT services Psychiatric Beds (Inpatient Hospital)
Outpatient surgical services Vision care Non-Emergency Transportation (Mental Health)
Medical services provided by: Preventive Health Services provided by: AIS/MR Services
•  Physicians • Public Health Departments ICF/MR
•  Advanced Practice RNs • FQHCs Targeted Case Management (Behavioral Health)
•  Physician Assistants • Rural Health Centers Home and Community-Based Waiver Services
•  FQHCs Hearing Services (under age 21) Certain Medicare-Only Services:
•  Primary Care Centers Durable Medical Equipment • CORF Services
•  Rural Health Clinics Alternative Birthing Services • Chiropractors
Laboratory Podiatry Services • Physicians Assistant
X-rays Family Planning Clinic Services • Physical and Occupational Therapy
Appropriate Escort Meals and Lodging Renal Dialysis • Psychologist
Therapeutic Evaluation and Treatment: Hospice Services • Clinical Social Worker
•  Physical Therapy Organ Transplant Services Nursing Facility Services
•  Speech Therapy Specialized Case Management for Children and
Adults with Complex Conditions
EPSDT Special Services (Behavioral Health)
•  Occupational Therapy Behavioral Health (Limited to PCP) School-Based Services for Disabled Students
Home Health Services Medical Detoxiﬁcation Early Intervention Services for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities
Pharmacy and Limited OTC Drugs
Source: Bartosch and Haber (2004).
Table A2
First stage regression results of monthly HMO  enrollment on HMO eligibility.
Passport program KHS program
Child is Eligible For Managed Care (Based On Initial County of Residence and Time Period) 0.690***(0.002) 0.789*** (0.001)
30  Month–Year Dummies? Yes Yes
Child  Fixed Effects? Yes Yes
R2 0.69 0.75
#  children 4706 13,590
#  child – months 141,180 407,700
Source: De-identiﬁed, linked Medicaid claims and enrollment data provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
Notes: These regressions also include monthly controls for child age. Standard errors are given in parenthesis.
*  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 10% level.
*
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t
o
P
a
o
a
o
A
R
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
C
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D
D*  Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant difference at 1% level.
f course, our own. This project was supported with a grant from
he UK Center for Poverty Research through the U.S. Department
f Health and Human Services, Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary for
lanning and Evaluation, grant number 5 ASPE417-03 as well as
 Georgia State University Faculty Research Initiation Grant. The
pinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the
uthors and should not be construed as representing the opinions
r policy of the UKCPR or any agency of the Federal government.
ppendix A.
See Appendix Tables A1 and A2.
eferences
ngrist, J.D., Krueger, A.B., 2001. Instrumental variables and the search for identi-
ﬁcation: from supply and demand to natural experiments. J. Econ. Perspect. 15
(4),  69–85.
izer, A., Currie, J., Moretti, E., 2007. Does managed care hurt health? Evidence from
medicaid mothers? Rev. Econ. Stat. 89 (3), 385–399.
izer, A., 2007. Public health insurance. Program take-up, and child health. Rev.
Econ. Stat. 89 (3), 400–415.
izer, A., Currie, J., 2002. The Impact of Outreach on Medi-Cal Enrollment and Child
Health: Lessons from California. California Policy Research Center Report.
aicker, K., Chernew, M.,  Robbins, J., 2013. The Spillover Effects of Medicare Managed
Care: Medicare Advantage and Hospital Utilization. NBER Working Paper No.
19070.
arham, T., Gertler, P., Raube, K., 2013. Managed Care Mandates and Birth Outcomes:
Who  Beneﬁts and Does the Model Matter., accessed from http://www.colorado.
edu/ibs/HB/barham/PAPERS/Barham Gertler Raube MediCal April2013.pdf
Dartosch, W.J., Haber, S.G., 2004. Evaluation of the Kentucky Health Care Partnership
Program: A Comparison of the Managed Care Experiences in Regions 3 and 5 –
Final  Report. RTI International.
erwick, D.M., Nolan, T.W., Whittington, J., 2008. The triple aim: care, health, and
cost.  Health Aff. (Millwood) 27 (3), 759–769.
lack, S.E., 1999. Do better schools matter? Parental valuation of elementary edu-
cation. Q. J. Econ. 114 (2), 577–599.
urns, L., Pauley, M.,  2012. Accountable care organizations may have difﬁculty
avoiding the failures of integrated delivery networks of the 1990s. Health Aff.
(Millwood) 31 (11), 2407–2416.
ebul, R., Rebitzer, J., Taylor, L., Votruba, M., 2008. Organizational fragmentation and
care  quality in the U.S. healthcare system. J. Econ. Perspect. 22 (4), 93–113.
halkley, M.,  Tilley, C., 2006. Treatment intensity and provider remuneration: den-
tists in the British National Health Service. Health Econ. 15 (9), 933–946.
ooper, D., Rebitzer, J., 2002. Physician Incentives in Managed Care Organizations.
Public Policy Brief. Levy Institute, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York.
urrie, J., Fahr, J., 2005. Medicaid managed care: effects on children’s medicaid
coverage and utilization. J. Public Econ. 89, 85–108.
utler, D.M., Gruber, J., 1996. Does public insurance crowd out private insurance?
Q.  J. Econ. 111 (2), 391–430.
utler, D., McClellan, M.,  Newhouse, J., 2000. How does managed care do it? RAND
J.  Econ. 31 (3), 526–548.
utler, D.M., Reber, S., 1998. Paying for health insurance: the tradeoff between
competition and adverse selection. Q. J. Econ. 113 (2), 433–466.
utler, D.M., Zeckhauser, R.J., 2000. The anatomy of health insurance. In: Culyer, A.,
Newhouse, J. (Eds.), Handbook of Health Economics, vol. IA. Elsevier, Amster-
dam, pp. 563–643.
uggan, M.,  2004. Does contracting out increase the efﬁciency of government pro-
grams? Evidence from medicaid HMOs. J. Public Econ. 88, 2549–2572.
uggan, M.,  Hayford, T., 2013. Has the shift to managed care reduced medicaid
expenditures? Evidence from state and local-level mandates. J. Policy Anal.
Manage. 32 (3), 505–535.
usheiko, M., Gravelle, H., Jacobs, R., Smith, P., 2006. The effect of ﬁnancial incentives
on gatekeeping doctors: evidence from a natural experiment. J. Health Econ. 25
(3), 449–478.
6 ealth E
F
G
G
G
H
K
K
K
K
L
M
M
S
S8 J. Marton et al. / Journal of H
isher, E.S., Shortell, S.M., Kreindler, S.A., Van Citters, A.D., Larson, B.K., 2012.
A framework for evaluating the formation, implementation, and perfor-
mance of accountable care organizations. Health Aff. (Millwood) 31 (11),
2368–2378.
aynor, M.,  Rebitzer, J., Taylor, L., 2004. Physician incentives in HMOs. J. Polit. Econ.
112  (4), 915–931.
elbach, J.B., 2004. Migration, the life cycle, and state beneﬁts: how low is the
bottom? J. Polit. Econ. 112 (5), 1091–1130.
lied, S., 2000. Managed care. In: Culyer, A., Newhouse, J. (Eds.), Handbook of Health
Economics, vol. IA. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 707–754.
erring, B., Adams, E.K., 2011. Using HMOs to serve the medicaid population: what
are the effects on utilization and does the type of HMO  Matter? Health Econ. 20,
446–460.
aestner, R., Dubay, L., Kenney, G., 2005. Managed care and infant health: an eval-
uation of medicaid in the U.S. Soc. Sci. Med. 60 (8), 1815–1833.
aiser Family Foundation, 2007. Medicare Advantage Fact Sheet, accessed from:
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/2052-10.pdf
aiser Family Foundation, 2012. Medicaid Managed Care: Key Data, Trends, and
Issues, accessed from: http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8046-02.pdf
Sconomics 36 (2014) 47–68
elejian, H.H., 1971. Two-stage least squares and econometric systems linear in
parameters but nonlinear in the endogenous variables. J. Am.  Stat. Assoc. 66,
373–374.
uft, H., 1981. Health Maintenance Organizations: Dimensions of Performance. John
Wiley & Sons, New York.
iller, R.H., Luft, H.S., 1994. Managed care plan performance since 1980: a literature
analysis. J. Am.  Med. Assoc. 271 (16), 1512–1519.
iller, R.H., Luft, H.S., 1997. Does managed care lead to better or worse quality of
care? Health Aff. (Millwood) 16 (5), 7–25.
chwartz, A.L., Sommers, B.D., 2014. Moving for medicaid? Recent eligibility expan-
sions did not induce migration from other states. Health Aff. (Millwood) 33 (1),
88–94.
ong, Z., Safran, D.G., Landon, B.E., Landrum, M.B., He, Y., Mechanic, R.E., Day, M.P.,
Chernew, M.E., 2012. The ‘alternative quality contract,’ based on a global budget,
lowered medical spending and improved quality. Health Aff. (Millwood) 31 (8),
1885–1894.
parer, M.,  2012. Medicaid Managed Care: Costs, Access, and Quality of Care. Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation Synthesis Project, Research Synthesis Report No. 23.
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Princeton, NJ.
